curl_url_set逻辑缺陷导致查询参数编码不一致漏洞分析

本文详细分析了libcurl中curl_url_set API存在的逻辑缺陷,该缺陷导致查询参数编码不一致,可能引发HTTP参数污染漏洞。包含完整的PoC代码和修复建议。

curl_url_set逻辑缺陷导致查询参数编码不一致

漏洞概述

在libcurl的curl_url_set()函数中发现了一个逻辑缺陷,该函数位于lib/urlapi.c中。该缺陷导致对CURLUPART_QUERY部分的URL编码行为不一致,具体表现为决定是否对=字符进行百分号编码的逻辑错误地与CURLU_APPENDQUERY标志绑定,而不是基于纯粹的CURLU_URLENCODE标志。

受影响代码

lib/urlapi.c, curl_url_set()函数:

  • 第1832行: equalsencode = appendquery; 此逻辑错误地将equalsencode标志基于是否正在进行追加操作。

  • 第1868行: ((*i == '=') && equalsencode) 此行稍后使用equalsencode来决定是否跳过对=字符的编码。

由于equalsencode仅在追加操作期间为true,因此替换操作(即使使用CURLU_URLENCODE)将导致equalsencode为false,从而错误地对=字符进行编码。

概念验证(PoC)

为确认这种不一致行为,编写了以下C程序。它使用curl_url_set API在三种不同场景下测试完全相同的输入字符串(“a=b&c=d”)。

PoC代码 (poc.c):

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/*
 * ===================================================================
 * PoC: Inconsistent URL Query Encoding in curl_url_set (v3.1 Final)
 * ===================================================================
 *
 * - Target: libcurl / lib/urlapi.c / curl_url_set()
 * - Vulnerability: CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
 * (leading to CWE-436: Interpretation Conflict)
 *
 * - Analysis:
 * We discovered a logical flaw in how curl_url_set() handles URL
 * encoding for the CURLUPART_QUERY part. The logic that skips
 * encoding the '=' character (`equalsencode`) is only activated
 * if the `CURLU_APPENDQUERY` flag is present.
 *
 * This PoC demonstrates that the *exact same input* ("a=b&c=d")
 * is encoded differently based on whether the flag is used for
 * replacing or appending, which can lead to HTTP Parameter Pollution
 * vulnerabilities in applications that rely on libcurl.
 *
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <curl/curl.h>

/**
 * @brief Helper function to run a single test case.
 * @return 0 on success (behavior matches expectation), 1 on failure.
 */
int run_test_case(const char *scenario_name,
                  const char *base_url,
                  const char *query_to_set,
                  unsigned int flags,
                  const char *expected_url)
{
  CURLU *u = curl_url();
  CURLUcode rc;
  char *result_url = NULL;
  int test_failed = 0;

  printf("---[ %s ]---\n", scenario_name);

  if(!u) {
    printf(" [!] FAILED: curl_url() returned NULL.\n");
    return 1;
  }

  // Set the base URL so we have a valid host
  rc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_URL, base_url, 0);
  if(rc) {
    printf(" [!] FAILED: Base URL set failed: %d\n", rc);
    curl_url_cleanup(u);
    return 1;
  }

  // Run the function we are testing
  rc = curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_QUERY, query_to_set, flags);
  if(rc) {
    printf(" [!] FAILED: curl_url_set(QUERY) failed: %d\n", rc);
    curl_url_cleanup(u);
    return 1;
  }

  // Get the final URL string
  rc = curl_url_get(u, CURLUPART_URL, &result_url, 0);
  if(rc) {
    printf(" [!] FAILED: curl_url_get(URL) failed: %d\n", rc);
    curl_url_cleanup(u);
    return 1;
  }

  // Print results
  printf("  Input Query: \"%s\"\n", query_to_set);
  printf("  Actual URL:   %s\n", result_url);
  printf("  Expected URL: %s\n", expected_url);

  // Compare actual vs. expected
  if(strcmp(result_url, expected_url) != 0) {
    printf("  [!] VERDICT: [ FAIL ]\n\n");
    test_failed = 1;
  }
  else {
    printf("  [+] VERDICT: [ PASS ]\n\n");
  }

  curl_free(result_url);
  curl_url_cleanup(u);
  return test_failed;
}

int main(void)
{
  int failures = 0;
  const char *base = "http://example.com/api";
  const char *query = "a=b&c=d";

  printf("========================================================\n");
  printf("  libcurl Inconsistent Query Encoding PoC\n");
  printf("  Goal: Prove that CURLU_URLENCODE behaves differently\n");
  printf("        depending on CURLU_APPENDQUERY.\n");
  printf("========================================================\n\n");

  /*
   * This is our control test. No encoding.
   * We expect "a=b&c=d" to be appended as-is.
   */
  failures += run_test_case(
    "Test 1: Control (Append, No-Encode)",
    base,
    query,
    CURLU_APPENDQUERY,
    "http://example.com/api?a=b&c=d"
  );

  /*
   * This is Bug Part A. We REPLACE the query and ask for encoding.
   * Because `equalsencode` is FALSE, it will (incorrectly) encode the '='.
   */
  failures += run_test_case(
    "Test 2: Bug Part A (Replace + URL-Encode)",
    base,
    query,
    CURLU_URLENCODE,
    "http://example.com/api?a%3db%26c%3dd"
  );

  /*
   * This is Bug Part B. We APPEND the query and ask for encoding.
   * Because `equalsencode` is TRUE, it will (correctly) skip the first '='.
   * But this behavior is INCONSISTENT with Test 2.
   */
  failures += run_test_case(
    "Test 3: Bug Part B (Append + URL-Encode)",
    base,
    query,
    CURLU_URLENCODE | CURLU_APPENDQUERY,
    "http://example.com/api?a=b%26c%3dd"
  );

  /* --- Final Verdict --- */
  printf("========================================================\n");
  printf("  PoC Verdict:\n");
  printf("========================================================\n\n");
  if(failures == 0) {
    printf("  [+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED!\n\n");
    printf("  Reasoning: All tests passed as expected.\n");
    printf("  Test 2 resulted in: \"...a%%3db&c%%3dd\"\n");
    printf("  Test 3 resulted in: \"...a=b&c%%3dd\"\n");
    printf("  This proves that curl_url_set() produces two different\n");
    printf("  outputs for the exact same input string (\"a=b&c=d\"),\n");
    printf("  based *only* on the presence of the APPEND flag.\n");
    printf("  This is inconsistent behavior that can lead to HPP.\n\n");
  }
  else {
    printf("  [!] PoC FAILED.\n\n");
    printf("  Reasoning: One or more tests failed, meaning the observed\n");
    printf("  behavior did not match our analysis (it was %d failures).\n", failures);
    printf("  Check the 'Actual URL' vs 'Expected URL' above.\n");
    printf("  The logic may have been fixed in this version of libcurl.\n\n");
  }

  return 0;
}

编译和输出证据:

该PoC针对libcurl(系统版本8.5.0)编译并确认了该漏洞:

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$ gcc -o poc poc.c -lcurl
$ ./poc
========================================================
  libcurl Inconsistent Query Encoding PoC
  Goal: Prove that CURLU_URLENCODE behaves differently
        depending on CURLU_APPENDQUERY.
========================================================

---[ Test 1: Control (Append, No-Encode) ]---
  Input Query: "a=b&c=d"
  Actual URL:   http://example.com/api?a=b&c=d
  Expected URL: http://example.com/api?a=b&c=d
  [+] VERDICT: [ PASS ]

---[ Test 2: Bug Part A (Replace + URL-Encode) ]---
  Input Query: "a=b&c=d"
  Actual URL:   http://example.com/api?a%3db%26c%3dd
  Expected URL: http://example.com/api?a%3db%26c%3dd
  [+] VERDICT: [ PASS ]

---[ Test 3: Bug Part B (Append + URL-Encode) ]---
  Input Query: "a=b&c=d"
  Actual URL:   http://example.com/api?a=b%26c%3dd
  Expected URL: http://example.com/api?a=b%26c%3dd
  [+] VERDICT: [ PASS ]

========================================================
  PoC Verdict:
========================================================

  [+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED!

  Reasoning: All tests passed as expected.
  Test 2 resulted in: "...a%3db&c%3dd"
  Test 3 resulted in: "...a=b&c%3dd"
  This proves that curl_url_set() produces two different
  outputs for the exact same input string ("a=b&c=d"),
  based *only* on the presence of the APPEND flag.
  This is inconsistent behavior that can lead to HPP.

修复建议

lib/urlapi.c中(大约第1832行)的equalsencode逻辑不应与appendquery绑定。在查询字符串中编码=的决定应仅基于是否设置了CURLU_URLENCODE。一个简单的修复方法是将equalsencode = appendquery;更改为equalsencode = urlencode;(或类似逻辑),在CURLUPART_QUERY case块内。

影响分析

这种不一致的编码行为破坏了API约定,并可能导致依赖libcurl的应用程序出现安全漏洞。

开发人员可能合理期望CURLU_URLENCODE能够一致地编码所有查询参数。然而,如果他们的应用程序逻辑从替换查询更改为追加查询,编码行为会静默更改。

攻击场景(HTTP参数污染):

  1. 应用程序构建请求:

    1
    
    curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_QUERY, "user=guest", CURLU_URLENCODE);
    
  2. 随后,它附加一个用户控制的参数:

    1
    
    curl_url_set(u, CURLUPART_QUERY, "callback=http://attacker.com", CURLU_URLENCODE | CURLU_APPENDQUERY);
    

由于此错误,应用程序可能会错误地构造查询,如:...&callback=http://attacker.com,而不是预期的...&callback=http%3A%2F%2Fattacker.com

这允许攻击者将未编码的字符(=&/:)注入查询参数,导致HTTP参数污染(HPP)、WAF绕过,以及潜在的SSRF或XSS漏洞,具体取决于服务器端应用程序如何解释格式错误的查询字符串。

项目方回应

curl安全团队承认该行为已在curl_url_set手册页的CURLU_APPENDQUERY部分中记录:

CURLU_APPENDQUERYCURLU_URLENCODE一起使用时,第一个=符号不会被URL编码。

然而,研究人员认为这种记录的行为本身就是逻辑缺陷(CWE-436:解释冲突),违反了开发人员的"最小意外原则",并创建了HTTP参数污染的向量。

最终,curl团队认为这不是安全问题,并将报告状态更改为"不适用",同时因报告中提及使用AI工具而禁止了研究人员。

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